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Abstract 
People’s implicit assumptions about ownership might influence their decisions in 
Dictator Games (DG), leading to generosity. Two studies tested subjects’ intuitions 
concerning ownership in fictional situations structurally analogous to the DG. Subjects 
read a story about a ritual in which an old man (experimenter in DG) provided an 
endowment that Person 1 (dictator in DG) had to allocate between self and Person 2 
(receiver in DG). Subjects were told that in some instances the ritual was interrupted 
before completion. As an assay of their intuitions regarding ownership, subjects were 
asked who owned the endowment and how it should be allocated after such 
interruptions. Results suggest that subjects assume the endowment primarily belonged 
to the experimenter throughout the DG, except when the dictator worked for it. These 
property right intuitions might account for allocation decisions in actual DGs. 
Keywords: ownership, property rights, dictator game 
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Ownership Intuitions and their Effects on Allocations in the Dictator Game  
Without shared assumptions underlying ownership and property rights, most human 
interactions, economic behavior, and culture would be unrecognizable. The concept of 
ownership is integral to cooperation, trust, morality, social status, and altruism. In the 
modern world, nearly all objects humans interact with have owners. Conflicts over 
ownership are the basis for careers and legal institutions. Despite the prevalence and 
importance of ownership, there has been relatively little psychological research on it.  
How is Ownership Represented and Inferred? 
Humans represent ownership over more forms of property and with greater 
complexity than any other organism. Many scholars, notably legal positivists, believe 
property rights to be a recent phenomenon, relying on a modern state and rule of law. 
As Jeremy Bentham put it, “Property and law are born together, and die together. 
Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property 
ceases,”(Bentham, 1931, p. 113). Legal positivism remains the dominant view in United 
States law today (Sprankling, 2012). Because the law is in principle a deductive 
process, this view of the psychology of ownership seems to suggest that representations 
flow from “top down” reasoning about laws or rules. 
 This idea faces several difficulties. First, legal battles over ownership are pervasive, 
suggesting that laws don’t reliably give rise to common ownership intuitions 
(Dukeminier, Krier, Alexander, & Schill, 2010). Ownership can be shared, uncertain, 
and ambiguous. For example, when an engagement is terminated, depending on the 
circumstances, people often feel both parties share ownership of the ring (Kruckenberg, 
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1997). Second, much of ownership psychology is unconscious. The experience of 
inferring an owner usually does not involve deliberate reasoning but rather an intuition 
arrives effortlessly into consciousness, (see Haidt (2001) for a parallel model of moral 
judgments). Lastly, there is extensive documentation of ownership psychology in non-
humans. These examples support the idea that ownership psychology played a role  in 
human evolution, and it is likely that ownership predates modern civilization (Gintis, 
2007). An alternative view of ownership psychology is that, like many other species, 
humans possess specialized cognitive circuitry which accepts cues from the 
environment, integrates them with relevant information in memory, and generates 
beliefs, sometimes probabilistic or distributed among multiple parties, about owners and 
their property rights. 
 Examples of animals that represent a form of property rights abound. Scholars have 
found that animals represent ownership over territory, food, water, valued objects, and 
mates. One cue animals use to determine ownership is temporal – they represent which 
individual or group occupied a territory first or for how long. Davies (1978) studied this 
phenomenon in speckled wood butterflies, which attract more mates when they occupy 
a spot of sun beneath the forest canopy. Males dispute the ownership of a sunspot by 
engaging in a “spiral flight,” a brief flight in which two males circle one another, one 
flies away, and the other returns to the sunspot. Davies observed that after each spiral 
flight, the intruder always yielded, while the owner always retained the territory. Next 
he removed some owners, waited for new males to occupy the territory for ten seconds, 
and then returned the original owners. Original owners were never successful in 
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displacing new ones. In a final manipulation, he secretly introduced an intruder such 
that the owner did not notice. The result was that both males “believed” they were the 
rightful owner, and engaged in spiral flights ten times longer than normal. Davies 
inferred that the butterflies solved disputes using the rule “resident wins, intruder 
retreats,” and that the time spent in or out of the territory determined ownership.  
Another cue animals use to settle territory disputes is number. Wilson, Hauser, and 
Wrangham (2001) studied groups of chimps in the Kibale National Park in Uganda. 
Males defend their territory by fighting intruders, but they choose to engage only when 
the ratio of defenders to intruders is sufficiently favorable. Wilson et al. (2001) recorded 
a “pant-hoot” (a call chimps produce throughout the day) of a foreign male and then 
played the call from speakers to groups of resident males. They found that when the 
groups of resident males numbered three or greater, they approached the sound and 
showed signs of aggression. Otherwise they remained silent and did not approach. 
Stevens (1988) observed groups of feral horses competing over pools of fresh water in 
the Rachel Carson Estuarine Sanctuary. Resident groups usually won disputes but in the 
cases where intruder groups won, the intruding group was larger.   
Dominance and gender also affect decisions about property rights. Sigg and Falett 
(1985) gave a can of food to a subordinate baboon for five minutes, allowing a 
dominant baboon to observe. Next they allowed the dominant to enter the subordinate’s 
cage and observed if the dominant took the can within thirty minutes. They varied the 
sex of the dominant and subordinate individuals in different conditions. Males took the 
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can from females on two thirds of the trials and females took it from females on half the 
trials. Neither males nor females ever took it from males.   
Kummer and Cords (1991) conducted a particularly interesting set of experiments, 
demonstrating more subtle cues that long-tailed macaques used to determine ownership 
over a tube of raisins. In three experimental conditions they 1) allowed a subordinate 
macaque to spend time with the tube in an enclosed area where the tube was fixed to an 
immobile object, 2) allowed the subordinate to hold the tube in its hand and move 
around with it, or 3) tied the tube to an immobile object with a short rope but allowed 
the subordinate to hold the tube in its hand and move it. In each case they allowed a 
dominant macaque to enter the room and observed if the dominant contested ownership 
over the tube. Only when the tube was fixed to the immobile object and impossible to 
grasp or move did the dominants always contest ownership of it. When the subordinate 
could possess and move the tube, even when it was tied to short rope, dominants never 
contested ownership. Many more studies demonstrate representations of ownership 
throughout the animal kingdom (Beletsky & Orians, 1989; Haley, 1994; Kemp & 
Wiklund, 2004; Olsson & Shine, 2000); for a detailed discussion of several see Alcock 
and Farley (2001).  
Moving into research with humans, one way scholars have explored cues that 
influence ownership has been by studying children. Because children have limited 
experience and linguistic abilities, findings that they represent property rights and 
ownership suggest that these phenomena do not have to be acquired through a general 
social learning process. Furby (1978), in early work in this area, interviewed children in 
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kindergarten, second, fifth, and eleventh grade as well as forty and fifty year old adults. 
Interviews included open ended questions like, “What does it mean that something is 
yours, that it belongs to you?”; “Why do you think people have things that belong just 
to them-why do people own things?” (Furby, 1978). The researchers identified 290 
categories of responses, which they used to code the content of all the interviews. 
Among the young children, current use of an object was the most commonly mentioned 
feature of ownership along with the right to control or allow who used the. (These 
patterns held for adults too). Children also responded that objects enable some activity 
or enjoyment for the owner and that the owner had a responsibility to care for the 
object.  
Eisenberg-Berg, Haake, and Bartlett (1981) paired 3-5 year old subjects with 
classmate controls of the same gender and age. They gave each subject a toy and said 
either “It’s yours to keep” or “It belongs to the group.” Children in the “it’s yours” 
condition possessed the toy longer, defended it from others more, and made more 
statements about owning it. Although this study did not demonstrate inference of 
ownership from nonverbal cues, it did show that young children understand property 
rights including the right to possess, use, and exclude others from using an object that 
one owns.  
Hook (1993) worked with 4-15 year old subjects as well as adults. In one 
experiment, researchers told subjects stories about people who acquired an object in 
different ways (found, stole, received as gift, and borrowed) and then refused to return 
the object to the owner. They asked subjects to rate how bad the characters’ behavior 
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was in each story. Younger children had a harder time distinguishing between 
wrongness of different modes of acquisition whereas older children thought stealing and 
borrowing were worse than finding or receiving as a gift. In another experiment, 
researchers examined the cues of first possession and creative effort. They told subjects 
a story about Damien, who possessed a block of wood then lent it to Alex who carved a 
valuable statue out of it, which an art dealer offered to buy. Damien wanted the wood 
back, to sell it to the art dealer, but Alex refused. Most subjects thought that Damien 
owned the wood but when asked who should receive the money from the art dealer, 
they responded that Alex should receive most of it.  
Friedman and Neary (2008) conducted several experiments looking at how 2-4 year 
old children use a “first possession heuristic” in determining ownership. They told 
children stories about two puppets that played with a toy, one after the other. Afterward, 
the researchers placed the puppets and the toy before the children and asked, “Whose 
toy is it?” On average, all age groups said the first possessor was the owner even when 
experimenters placed the toy next to the second possessor.  
In a study on infants’ understanding of antisocial behavior, Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, 
and Mahajan (2011) incidentally demonstrated a possible understanding of ownership in 
infants as young as five months. Seeking to test whether infants would prefer those who 
helped as opposed to those who hindered, they showed them a puppet playing with a 
ball and then dropping it. In the “help” condition, a second puppet retrieved the dropped 
ball and returned it to its owner. In the hinder condition, the second puppet picked up 
the ball and disappeared with it. When presented with a choice of which puppet to play 
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with, infants preferred the helper. The notion of helping and hindering, in this case, 
might have relied on an understanding that the first puppet owned the ball and 
absconding with it was antisocial because it violated property rights. The studies 
described here, along with several others (Bakeman & Brownlee, 1982; Eisenberg, 
Bartlett, & Haake, 1983; Fasig, 2000; Ross, 1996), have begun identifying cues that 
influence ownership but the body of literature remains slim.  
Property Rights & the Dictator Game 
One mature area of study that potentially offers a window into ownership 
psychology, especially as it functions in adults, is behavioral economics. Economic 
interactions regularly require people to make decisions about allocating, taking, sharing, 
giving, and excluding, and all of these phenomena involve ownership and property 
rights. The Dictator Game (DG) is one of the simplest and most popular designs in 
behavioral economics. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) invented a form of the 
DG consisting of two rounds. In round 1, subject A (the dictator) could allocate $20 
between self and subject B, evenly or unevenly. In round 2, subject C could allocate 
additional money between self and subjects A and B, depending on what subject A did 
in round 1. Subsequently Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton (1994) simplified the 
game to involve just a dictator and an anonymous receiver. In the canonical form today, 
the dictator is presented with an endowment (often $10) which she may allocate 
between self and an anonymous receiver however she likes. Dictators typically give 
away about 20%-30% of the endowment (Camerer, 2003). Over the years, the influence 
of the DG has been substantial. One review counted 129 publications and 41,443 DG 
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observations between 1992 and 2009 (Engel, 2011). These studies constitute one of the 
most significant explorations into human cooperation, generosity, altruism, trust, and 
fairness. 
A question that has spurred continuing DG research is why dictators give to 
strangers. From the standpoint of standard neoclassical economics, one might expect 
self-interested, money-maximizing subjects to keep the whole endowment. A number of 
explanations have been proposed to explain the standard DG results. One is inequity or 
inequality aversion (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Proponents of 
these theories contend that subjects are self-interested but that they also prefer to avoid 
greater differences in payoffs. In the DG, inequity aversion could cause subjects to 
avoid the most disparate payoffs like $10 for dictator and $0 for receiver. Indeed, a 
common choice for dictators is an even 50/50 split (Engel, 2011). Mixing the preference 
to avoid inequality with self-interest might explain the why dictators on average give 
away 20%-30%. Other theorists propose that people have “maximin” preferences, that 
is, the preference to maximize the minimum payoff (Charness & Rabin, 2002; 
Engelmann & Strobel, 2004). This idea formed a pillar of John Rawls’ theory of 
distributive justice: "The basic structure is perfectly just when the prospects of the least 
fortunate are as great as they can be,” (Rawls, 1999, p. 138). Again, mixing a maximin 
preference with self-interest could lead to the observed DG results. Another influential 
theory is a reformulation of rational choice theory to include as a payoff the positive 
feelings of prosocial behavior like giving. It could be “payoffs” include more than 
merely the amount of money people receive from the DG. Factoring in positive feelings 
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as part of the payoffs, allows a self-interested model to account for DG findings 
(Andreoni, 1990).  
While these theories capture important facts about human preferences, we believe an 
alternative idea, focused on ownership and property rights might contribute to 
understanding DG behavior. Current theories focus on modeling preferences while 
remaining largely silent on what cognitive processes people use to satisfy their 
preferences. In addition, they do not examine ownership directly, focusing exclusively 
on preferred outcomes without accounting for prior ownership of resources. Because 
subjects often pass quizzes demonstrating their explicit knowledge of the rules of the 
game and consequences of their choices, some scholars seem satisfied that confusion 
over ownership doesn’t exist (Baumard & Sperber, 2010; Henrich, 2000).  
Several studies provide evidence that property rights affect DG decisions. Hoffman, 
McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994) included three manipulations to the DG and 
Ultimatum Game (UG). First, rather than randomly assigning certain subjects to be 
dictators, they asked subjects to take a general knowledge quiz and then told the entire 
group that those who scored highest on the quiz had “earned” the position of dictator 
and hence, control over the endowment. Second, rather than framing the interaction as 
dividing money between self and an anonymous other, they instructed dictators that 
they were involved in an “exchange” in which the dictator was a “seller” and the 
receiver was a “buyer.” The dictator chose a division of money to “sell” to the receiver, 
which, in the case of the DG, the receiver simply had to accept or “buy.” Third, they 
included a double-blind condition in which they provided dictators with envelopes 
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containing ten $1 bills and ten blank slips of paper, except two random dictators who 
received envelopes with twenty blank slips of paper and no money. Only the individual 
dictators knew which envelope they had received. Each dictator was instructed to 
remove slips of paper and dollar bills, however they wanted, such that the total number 
removed equaled ten ($3 and 7 slips of paper for example), then seal and return the 
envelope. This procedure ensured that only individual dictators knew their decisions.  
Each of these three manipulations reduced giving. Changes in how dictators inferred 
their ownership over the endowment might account for the results. If one truly owns 
something, one is not compelled to give it away. Hoffman et al. (1994) describe a 
property right as a guarantee that you will not be punished for what would otherwise be 
considered a punishable offense: “The guarantee is against reprisal, in that a property 
right places restrictions on punishment strategies which might otherwise be used to 
insure cooperative behavior” (pg. 350).  In the case of the DG, dictators give less when 
they infer that their property rights allow them to do so. Earning something is an 
intuitive way that ownership is transferred. Many other studies involving DGs and UGs 
support the idea that when people earn the endowment they have more of a right to keep 
it (Cherry, Frykblom, & Shogren, 2002; Hoffman & Spitzer, 1985; List, 2007; Oxoby & 
Spraggon, 2008). “Selling” a division of the endowment to the receiver could have 
given rise to an inference that to sell something one must own it first. The relationship 
between the double-blind condition and ownership is less direct. By allowing dictators 
to make their decisions with total secrecy, the manipulation did not impact inferences 
about ownership. Rather, it achieved what property rights normally do: a guarantee not 
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to be punished. True anonymity left dictators with the ability to behave selfishly without 
any fear of reprisal, even in the form of a disapproving look from the experimenter. 
Investigating Cues of Ownership in the DG 
The canonical DG might evoke a certain degree of confusion or at least ambiguity 
with respect to property rights because different cues for ownership point to different 
players. Normally, the experimenter is the first possessor, there is no legitimate transfer 
of ownership to the dictator, but the dictator has the power to allocate. This confusion 
over ownership could be important for explaining dictator behavior, considering that 
previous studies demonstrate that when property rights are manipulated, giving 
decreases. We wanted to examine intuitions about ownership in the DG as directly as 
possible by asking subjects about them, while manipulating variables that we had 
reason to believe were relevant to ownership.  
In 1654, Blaise Pascal famously invented probability theory to solve the following 
problem: If a game of chance is interrupted before completion and players have 
different chances of winning (they hold different cards in a game of poker for example), 
how can the stakes be divided fairly (Hacking, 1984)? This exercise inspired our design 
to probe ownership intuitions in the DG. If the DG is interrupted at various stages, who 
owns the endowment and how should it be divided? Subjects read about a fictional DG 
which was interrupted after key events. Subjects were asked to judge who owned the 
endowment, how the endowment should be allocated with the interaction interrupted, 
and to rate the moral wrongness and unfairness of different allocations.  
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Predictions were as follows: 1) Subjects’ judgment of who owned the endowment 
would change depending on the stage of the game, with the experimenter owning the 
endowment earlier due to the first possession cue and the dictator owning it during or 
after allocation because giving might confer ownership. 2) At various points in the 
game, ownership would be distributed among experimenter, dictator, and receiver. That 
is, ownership would not be exclusive but rather shared.  3) Subjects’ judgments of who 
owned the endowment and their decision of how they would allocate the endowment 
would be strongly correlated. 4) Judgments of ownership, allocation, fairness, and 
moral rightness would be positively correlated by virtue of the intuition that it is fair 
and morally right for someone to keep something when they own it. 5) If there were a 
legitimate cue signaling a shift in ownership from experimenter to dictator, (e.g., if the 
dictator worked for the endowment), then subjects would judge the dictator to be the 
owner more than the experimenter. Experiment 1 was designed to test the first four 
predictions. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Design 
We asked subjects to read a story analogous to the Dictator Game. The story is about 
a custom called “The Meeting” which took place medieval times. According to this 
custom, the oldest man in the village (experimenter in DG) recruits two random 
villagers, Person 1 and Person 2 (dictator and receiver), at the marketplace. He invites 
each to his house (research laboratory) to participate in an interaction and promises 
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them a free meal for showing up (payment for participation). In one room in the house, 
the old man presents Person 1 with two boxes. Box 1 contains 10 eggs (the endowment) 
and box 2 is empty. Person 1 can allocate however many eggs he wishes to Person 2 by 
taking them from box 1 and placing them into box 2. Then the old man goes to a 
different room in the house and gives box 2 to Person 2, both Person 1 and Person 2 
receive a free meal, and they leave with their boxes. The old man covers his eyes during 
Person 1’s decision and keeps the identities of Person 1 and Person 2 secret.  
Subjects first read how The Meeting normally went, that is when the DG was played 
to completion. Next subjects read one of several different accounts of when The 
Meeting was interrupted at some key moment because lightning struck the old man’s 
house. We included illustrations to assist subjects’ understanding (see Appendix A). 
After reading each story we presented subjects with a simple quiz to test their 
understanding. If they did not answer correctly we eliminated them from the study.  
We chose the following points at which to introduce an interruption: 1) Just before 
the old man entered the room where Person 1 was, 2) just before Person 1 made a 
decision, 3) just after Person 1 made a decision (we did not specify what the decision 
was), and 4) just before the old man gave Person 1’s allocation to Person 2 in the other 
room. 
Subjects 
197 subjects from the United States, among them 120 women, were recruited using 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Ages ranged from 18 to 75, M = 32.06, SD = 12.38. Subjects 
were randomly assigned to each of the experimental conditions. 
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Materials 
The experiment was conducted via a web-based survey service (www.qualtrics.com). 
Each scenario was presented on a different page along with questions. 
Elimination quiz 
Subjects answered two multiple choice questions. One was, “Which of the 
following events occur in The Meeting?” The choices were A) Person 1 and Person 2 
don't meet each other B) The oldest man in the village meets Person 1 and Person 2 C) 
The oldest man in the village doesn't tell Person 2 who Person 1 is D) Person 1 and 
Person 2 get free meals E) All of the above F) The first two choices only. The correct 
answer was, “All of the above.” The second question was, “Which of the following 
events does NOT occur in The Meeting?” The choices were A) Person 1 decides how 
many eggs to put into box 2 B) Person 1 and Person 2 meet C) The oldest man in the 
village covers his eyes so he doesn't see what Person 1's decision is. The correct answer 
was, “Person 1 and Person 2 meet.” 
Ownership, allocation, morality and fairness items 
Subjects answered a forced choice question, “Who owns the eggs?” choosing 
between old man, Person 1, or Person 2. Next subjects answered the question, “Who 
should keep the eggs? Please enter the number of eggs that you think each person 
should keep.” They entered a number for old man, Person 1 and Person 2. The total had 
to add up to ten eggs. Next subjects responded to three items on a 1-7 scale. The items 
were, “Please enter how morally wrong you think it would be for each person to keep 
all the eggs after The Meeting is interrupted,” “Please enter how unfair you think it 
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would be for each person to keep all the eggs after The Meeting is interrupted,” and “To 
what extent do you think each character in the story owns the eggs, after The Meeting is 
interrupted?” 
Procedure  
 Subjects completed the experiment over the internet. They read an informed 
consent document, read the instructions, and began the experiment. After finishing the 
experiment, subjects provided demographic information. The procedure took about 20 
minutes. Procedures were approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional 
Review Board.  
Results 
We first tabulated ownership decisions, that is, subjects’ decisions about who owned 
the eggs (the endowment) at the different times when the interruption occurred. The 
results of the forced choice measure are shown in Table 1. The difference among 
conditions was significant, χ2(6) = 33.19, p < .0011. Given the hypothesis that 
ownership intuitions change due to cues like first possession and allocation, we 
explored the differences between interruption times, in the order they occur in the DG 
(in other words we compared neighboring interruption times). The difference between 1 
and 2 was significant, χ2(1) = 16.88, p < .001. This could be because after interruption 
1, the first possession cue caused subjects to infer that the old man (experimenter) was 
the owner but after interruption 2, more subjects judged Person 1 (dictator) to be the 
                                                   
1
 Where cells had a sample size less than 10 we ran Fisher’s exact tests which showed the same groups to 
be significantly different as a traditional chi-square analysis. 
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owner because he was about to allocate. The remaining differences, between 2-3 and 3-
4, were not significant, χ2(1) = 1.92, p = .17 (df was only 1 because cells for Person 2 
(receiver) contained 0 and were not included) and χ2(2) = 5.32, p = .07.  
Subjects rated to what extent they believed each character owned the eggs after the 
DG was interrupted, from 1 (no ownership) to 7 (complete ownership). These results 
are summarized in Table 2. The old man (experimenter) retained most of the ownership 
throughout the DG and Person 1 (dictator) had the second most, depending on the stage 
of the game. We entered ownership ratings for each character into separate ANOVAs as 
dependent variables with the time of interruption as the independent variable in each. 
There was a significant effect of interruption time in all three ANOVAs, F(3, 194) = 
10.32 for old man, F(3, 195) = 12.27 for Person 1, and F(3, 191) = 6.45 for Person 2, all 
ps < .001. Tukey (HSD) post hoc tests revealed significant differences between 
interruptions 1 and 2 for both the old man and Person 1, ps < .001.   
We were interested in whether subjects represented ownership as exclusive to one 
individual at a time or shared among multiple individuals. If ownership were exclusive, 
then we would expect to find one character (the owner) with high ownership ratings and 
both the remaining characters (non-owners) with low ratings. Person 2 (receiver) had 
low ownership ratings at all stages of the DG, so we decided that the most interesting 
changes in ownership were between the old man (experimenter) and Person 1 (dictator). 
Following this logic, we created a measure of ownership exclusivity between old man 
and Person 1 by taking the absolute value of the difference between their ownership 
ratings from each subject. For example, if a subject rated the old man’s ownership at 6 
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and Person 1’s ownership at 4, then the ownership exclusivity value would be 2 for that 
subject. We entered these values as a dependent variable into an ANOVA with time of 
interruption as the independent variable. If ownership were exclusive, then we would 
expect the difference to be large and to remain the same throughout the DG. The 
ANOVA showed that differences in ownership changed during the game F(3, 197) = 
12.34, p < .001.  
We also calculated the average number of eggs allocated by subjects to each of the 
three characters in the story, after each interruption. See Table 3 for a summary of these 
results. Because changes in subjects’ judgment of ownership and cues that might 
influence ownership mainly involved the old man and Person 1 (almost no one said 
Person 2 was the owner and allocations to Person 2 were the lowest), we chose to focus 
on the transfer of ownership from old man to Person 1. Because allocation amounts 
were not independent (amounts had to sum to 10), we only entered the allocation of 
eggs to old man as the dependent variable into an ANOVA with time of interruption as 
the independent variable. There was a significant effect of interruption time, F(3, 197) = 
12.97, p < .001. Tukey (HSD) post hoc tests revealed a significant difference between 
interruption 1 and interruption 2, p < .001.   
Ownership decisions (who is the owner) and allocation decisions (how many eggs 
each character should keep after the DG is interrupted) were strongly associated. We 
entered the ownership decisions as an independent variable and allocation to the old 
man as dependent variable in an ANOVA, which showed a significant effect of 
ownership decision, F(2, 197) = 96.59, p < .001. We also split the allocation data into 
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two groups: allocations made to characters who were judged to be owners and 
allocations made to characters who were not judged to be owners. For each allocation 
decision, there was one owner and two non-owners. We averaged the non-owner 
allocations in each case so the owner and non-owner groups had the same number of 
data points. Then we used a t-test to show that subjects allocated significantly more 
eggs to owners than non-owners. The results of this test and others can be seen in Table 
6.  
Subjects rated on a scale of 1-7 how morally wrong they thought it would be if each 
character kept all the eggs (the endowment) after the DG was interrupted from 1 (not 
morally wrong at all) to 7 (totally morally wrong). These results are summarized in 
Table 4. For each character (old man, Person 1, Person 2), we entered wrongness ratings 
into an ANOVA as the dependent variable and interruption time as the independent 
variable. There was a significant effect of interruption time for the old man, F(3, 197) = 
4.61, p < .01. Post hoc Tukey (HSD) tests revealed that the only significant difference 
was between interruption 1 and 4, p < .01. The results were not significant for Person 1, 
F(3, 197) = 2.25, p = .08 or for Person 2, F(3, 196) = 1.28, p = .28. 
Subjects rated on a scale of 1-7 how unfair they thought it would be if each character 
kept all the eggs (the endowment) after the DG was interrupted from 1 (not unfair at all) 
to 7 (totally unfair). These results are summarized in Table 5. For each character (old 
man, Person 1, Person 2), we entered unfairness ratings into an ANOVA as the 
dependent variable and interruption time as the independent variable. There was a 
significant effect of interruption time for the old man, F(3, 197) = 8.59, p < .001. Post 
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hoc Tukey (HSD) tests revealed that the effect was driven by a significant difference 
between interruption 4 and all other interruptions, ps < .02.  The results were not 
significant for Person 1, F(3, 196) = 1.96, p = .12 or for Person 2, F(3, 196) = 0.39, p = 
.76. 
Both the moral wrongness and unfairness of keeping the entire endowment were 
negatively correlated with judgment of ownership. We performed a t-test, comparing 
the moral wrongness ratings between the two groups “keeper is owner” and “keeper is 
not owner.” That is, one group comprised the moral wrongness ratings of characters 
whom the subjects judged to be owners. In the other group, we entered the moral 
wrongness ratings of characters whom subjects did not judge to be owners. We 
averaged the two non-owner ratings as described above so that the two groups would 
have the same number of data points. We performed this same procedure with the 
unfairness ratings. Subjects rated that it was less unfair and less morally wrong for 
owners, as opposed to non-owners, to keep the entire endowment. See Table 6 for a 
summary of the results.  
Experiment 2  
We hypothesized that when the dictator works for the endowment, there is a 
legitimate transfer of property rights and ownership from the experimenter to the 
dictator. In Experiment 2, we examined how this transfer would affect judgments of 
ownership, wrongness, and fairness, as well as allocation decisions.  We predicted that 
after Person 1 worked for the endowment, subjects would judge Person 1 to own the 
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endowment more, allocate more of the endowment to Person 1, and judge it to be less 
wrong and unfair for Person 1 to keep all of the endowment.  
Method 
Design 
Subjects read a story analogous to the DG. We used the same story and images as in 
Experiment 1 but with a key difference. Rather than simply handing box 1 with 10 eggs 
to Person 1 to make an allocation decision, the old man first asks Person 1 to retrieve 
firewood from outside the house. For each piece of wood that Person 1 brings into the 
house, the old man puts one egg into box 1 until Person 1 has retrieved ten pieces of 
wood and the old man has put 10 eggs into box 1. Then the story proceeds exactly as in 
Experiment 1 (see Appendix B for full story). Subjects first read how The Meeting 
normally went, that is when the DG was played to completion. Next subjects read one 
of several different accounts of when the game was interrupted at a key moment 
because lightning struck the old man’s house. Elimination procedures were the same as 
in Experiment 1. We chose the following points at which to introduce an interruption: 
1) just before the Old Man entered the room with Person 1 (no work is done yet), 2) just 
before Person 1 made a decision (after work was done), and 3) just after Person 1 made 
a decision (we did not specify what the decision was). 
Subjects Materials and Procedures 
159 subjects from the United States, among them 87 women, 72 men, were recruited 
from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Ages ranged from 18 to 67, M = 33.23, SD = 13.02. 
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Subjects were randomly assigned to each of the experimental conditions. The materials 
and procedures were the same as Experiment 1 and differed only in the scenario stimuli. 
Results 
We first tabulated ownership decisions. These results are summarized in Table 7. 
The difference among conditions was significant, χ2(4) = 54.91, p < .001. The key 
difference was between conditions 1 and 2 because after interruption 1, Person 1 has not 
yet worked but after interruption 2, he has worked for the endowment. The difference 
between conditions 1 and 2 was significant χ2(1) = 43.44, p < .001 (df was 1 because 
Person 2 cells contained 0 and were not included) while the difference between 2 and 3 
was not significant χ2(2) = 1.03, p =.60. In Experiment 1, the majority of subjects said 
the old man (experimenter) was the owner throughout the entire game whereas in 
Experiment 2, after Person 1 (dictator) worked for the endowment, most subjects said 
Person 1 is the owner.  
Subjects rated to what extent they believed each character owned the eggs after the 
DG was interrupted, from 1 (no ownership) to 7 (complete ownership). These results 
are summarized in Table 8. After Person 1 worked for the endowment, subjects on 
average judged him to own it more than the old man. The extent to which ownership is 
shared is demonstrated by almost no difference between the mean ratings of old man 
and Person 1 ownership after interruption 2. For each character (old man, Person 1, 
Person 2), we entered ownership ratings into an ANOVA as the dependent variable and 
interruption time as the independent variable. There was a significant effect of 
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interruption time for all three ANOVAs F(2, 158) = 39.58, p < .001 for old man, F(2, 
158) = 46.60, p <.001 for Person 1, and F(2, 155) = 7.94, p = .001 for Person 2. Tukey 
(HSD) post hoc tests revealed significant differences between interruptions 1 and 2 for 
both the old man and Person 1, ps < .001.  The difference between interruptions 2 and 3 
was significant for the old man, p = .04, and for Person 2, p = .001.    
We also calculated the average number of eggs allocated by subjects to each of the 
three characters in the story, for each condition. See Table 9 for a summary of these 
results. Based on the same reasoning in Experiment 1, the allocations to the old man 
were entered as the dependent variable into an ANOVA with interruption time as the 
independent variable. There was a significant effect of interruption time, F(2, 159) = 
33.79, p < .001. Post-hoc tests (Tukey HSD) showed a significant difference between 
interruptions 1 and 2, p < .001 and between interruptions 2 and 3, p = .05.  
Ownership decisions and allocation decisions were strongly associated. We entered 
the ownership decisions as independent variable and allocation to the old man as 
dependent variable in an ANOVA, which showed a significant effect of ownership 
decision, F(2, 159) = 88.34, p < .001. We also split the allocation data into two groups 
(owners and non-owners) as explained in Experiment 1 and conducted a t-test which 
showed that subjects allocated significantly more eggs to owners than non-owners. The 
results of this test and others are shown in Table 10.  
Subjects rated on a scale of 1-7 how unfair and how morally wrong they thought it 
would be if each character kept all the eggs after the DG was interrupted. These results 
are summarized in Table 11. Both the moral wrongness and unfairness of keeping the 
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entire endowment were negatively correlated with judgment of ownership. Unlike in 
Experiment 1, Person 1 (dictator) received about the same or lower 
unfairness/wrongness ratings compared to old man (experimenter) for keeping the 
endowment after interruptions 2 and 3. This is because after interruptions 2 and 3, 
Person 1 has worked for the endowment. As in Experiment 1, we compared subjects’ 
ratings of wrongness and unfairness across two groups: When the keeper of the 
endowment is the owner versus non-owner. See Table 10 for results of t-tests. Subjects 
rated that it was less unfair and less morally wrong for owners to keep the entire 
endowment than for non-owners to keep it. 
Discussion 
Our main findings suggest that ownership influences decisions in the DG. In both 
experiments, subjects chose to allocate more of the endowment to those they judged to 
be owners rather than non-owners. Subjects also rated that it was less unfair and less 
morally wrong for owners, rather than non-owners, to keep the entire endowment.  
Explicit rules or norms did not appear to influence judgments of ownership. All 
subjects were aware of the normal rules of the DG, including the usual ability of the 
dictator to allocate the endowment and the fact that the experimenter never kept 
anything. Yet in Experiment 1, an examination of the canonical DG, subjects responded 
that the experimenter owned the endowment the most, throughout the entire game. 
These findings suggest that the explicit instructions subjects receive in the canonical 
DG might not cause a representation of a legitimate transfer of ownership.  
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Cues on the other hand, seemed to play an important role in judgments of ownership. 
Despite having no explicit statements in the instructions about ownership, subjects had 
no trouble spontaneously inferring owners. As predicted, the experimenter received the 
highest ownership ratings earliest in the DG. This finding makes sense, if being the first 
possessor of something confers ownership of it. The allocating and working for the 
endowment also shifted ownership judgments. In Experiment 1, the ownership ratings 
for the dictator increased around the moment of allocation. In Experiment 2, when the 
dictator worked for the endowment, we observed a shift of the highest ownership 
ratings and allocations from experimenter to dictator.  
Ownership was not always exclusive and clear, but rather shared and ambiguous. In 
the forced choice measure, a significant proportion of subjects disagreed as to whether 
the experimenter or the dictator was the owner. This proportion changed throughout the 
DG, according to environmental cues. In addition, when asked to rate the extent of 
ownership, subjects’ ratings changed throughout the game, at one point reaching almost 
identical ratings for experimenter and dictator.  
These findings have implications for both DG research and cognitive research about 
ownership and property rights. Economists who focus on explaining why dictators give 
any of the endowment away might benefit from understanding the relationship between 
ownership and concepts of fairness, moral wrongness and altruism. It could be the case 
that because dictators don’t infer legitimate ownership of the endowment, it does not 
feel morally right or fair to keep it all, and so they give some away. If ownership were 
clearer, giving might decrease.  
30 
 
Research on the cognition that leads to ownership inferences might benefit from 
further exploring which environmental cues shift people’s judgments the most. We hope 
future work will examine cues like trading for, finding, receiving as a gift, needing 
more than others, receiving more benefit from, creating, and others. In addition, exactly 
how multiple cues interact, leading to final determinations of who owns what, is still a 
mystery.  
Of course, these findings have limitations. It is unclear to what extent we can predict 
behavior in real DGs, or real world situations for that matter, from subjects’ responses 
to vignettes about the DG. In addition, explorations into the cognition of ownership on 
the one hand and the psychology of phenomena like altruism, selfishness, wrongness 
and fairness on the other, might be better carried out as separate endeavors.  
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Table 1 
% of Subjects who Said Each Character Was the Owner 
Interruption  n Old Man Person 1 Person 2 
1-Before old man entered room 1  54 94% 6% 0% 
2-Before Person 1 made a decision  49 61% 39% 0% 
3-After Person 1 made a decision  47 74% 26% 0% 
4-Before old man gave box 2 to Person 2  47 68% 21% 11% 
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Table 2 
Mean(SD) Rating From 1-7 of Ownership 
Interruption Old Man Person 1  Person 2 
1-Before old man entered room 1 6.63(1.25) 1.48(1.46) 1.13(.70) 
2-Before Person 1 made a decision 4.81(2.45) 3.60(2.56) 1.58(1.50) 
3-After Person 1 made a decision 5.28(2.31) 2.96(2.13) 1.76(1.40) 
4-Before old man gave box 2 to Person 2 4.47(2.31) 3.70(2.19 2.36(1.89) 
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Table 3 
Mean (SD) Eggs Allocated by Subjects to Each Character 
Interruption Old Man Person 1 Person 2 
1-Before old man entered room 1 9.15(2.74) 0.66(2.2) 0.20(.96) 
2-Before Person 1 made a decision 5.14(4.76) 3.96(4.29) 0.90(1.77) 
3-After Person 1 made a decision 5.64(4.76) 2.87(3.4) 1.49(2.23) 
4-Before old man gave box 2 to Person 2 4.47(4.29) 3.46(2.75) 2.15(2.6) 
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Table 4 
Mean Wrongness(SD) Ratings from 1-7 for Keeping All Eggs After Interruption 
Interruption Old Man Person 1 Person 2 
1-Before old man entered room 1 1.65(1.76) 5.43(2.00) 5.68(1.86) 
2-Before Person 1 made a decision 2.51(2.14) 4.61(2.12) 5.43(1.90) 
3-After Person 1 made a decision 2.11(1.89) 4.51(2.38) 5.23(2.21) 
4-Before old man gave box 2 to Person 2 3.15(2.54) 4.43(2.38) 4.89(2.27) 
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Table 5 
Mean Unfairness(SD) Ratings from 1-7 for Keeping All Eggs After Interruption 
Interruption Old Man Person 1  Person 2  
1-Before old man entered room 1 1.61(1.53) 5.49(2.02) 5.89(1.74) 
2-Before Person 1 made a decision 2.39(2.03) 4.45(2.29) 5.65(1.80) 
3-After Person 1 made a decision 2.45(2.12) 4.85(2.29) 5.77(1.82) 
4-Before old man gave box 2 to Person 2 3.72(2.64) 4.87(2.21) 5.51(1.89) 
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Table 6 
Means and t-test results for Allocation, Wrongness, Unfairness. Owners Versus Non-
Owners 
Measure 
Mean For 
Owners 
Mean For     
Non-Owners t p  df 
  
Allocations (10 eggs) 7.91 1.05 25.47 <.001 392 
Moral Wrongness (1-7) 2.09 5.14 15.44 <.001 392 
Unfairness (1-7) 2.18 5.46 17.36 <.001 392 
Note. All t tests were within-subject and two-tailed.  
42 
 
 
Table 7 
% of Subjects who Said Each Character Was the Owner 
Interruption n Old Man Person 1 Person 2 
1-Before old man  entered room 1 49 98% 2% 0% 
2-Before Person 1 made a decision 55 36% 64% 0% 
3-After Person 1 made a decision 55 34% 64% 2% 
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Table 8 
Mean(SD) Rating From 1-7 of Ownership 
Interruption Old Man Person 1 Person 2 
1-Before old man  entered room 1 6.76(1.05) 1.25(1.00) 1.23(0.93) 
2-Before Person 1 made a decision 4.18(2.46) 4.31(2.57) 1.07(0.43) 
3-After Person 1 made a decision 3.20(2.34) 4.87(2.07) 1.83(1.46) 
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Table 9 
Mean (SD)Eggs Allocated by Subjects to Each Character 
Interruption Old Man Person 1 Person 2 
1-Before old man  entered room 1 8.45(3.32) 0.78(1.66) 0.78(1.66) 
2-Before Person 1 made a decision 4.04(4.55) 4.45(3.87) 1.51(2.18) 
3-After Person 1 made a decision 2.27(3.70) 6.16(3.64) 1.56(2.31) 
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Table 10  
Means and t-test results for Allocation, Wrongness, and Unfairness. Owners Versus 
Non-Owners 
 
Comparison 
Mean for 
Owners 
Mean for 
Non-Owners t p df 
Allocations (10 eggs) 7.61 1.19 21.168 <.001 316 
Moral Wrongness (1-7) 2.08 5.30 15.179 <.001 316 
Unfairness (1-7) 2.26 5.48 14.998 <.001 316 
Note. All t tests were within-subject and two-tailed.  
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Table 11  
Mean Wrongness and Unfairness Ratings from 1-7 for Keeping All Eggs After 
Interruption 
 Old Man Person 1 Person 2 
Interruption     W        U     W        U         W        U 
1-Before old man  entered room 1 1.24     1.22 5.81     6.08 5.85     6.00 
2-Before Person 1 made a decision 3.47     3.89 3.82     4.07 5.73     6.02 
3-After Person 1 made a decision 3.71     3.87 3.27     3.02 5.33     5.60 
Note. W = Wrongness and U = Unfairness. 
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Appendix A: Stimuli for Experiment 1 
Part I: Description of The Meeting 
During medieval times, there was a custom called The Meeting, which was performed 
every year. The Meeting normally went as follows:  
 
The Meeting 
 
The oldest man in the village would go into the marketplace.  
                 
He would randomly select two people who did not know each other (we can call them 
Person 1 and Person 2). He would approach each individually to preserve their 
anonymity and say, "I would like you to come to my house tomorrow and spend some 
time with me. I will give you a free meal just for showing up."
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 The following day, Person 1 and Person 2 would go to the house separately so that they 
49 
never saw each other.  
 
 The oldest man in the village would ask Person 1 to sit in 
50 
room 1 and ask Pe
in room 2.  
 
rson 2 to sit 
 Then the oldest man in the village would enter room 1 carrying two boxes. Box 1 would 
have 10 eggs in it. Box 2 would be empty.
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  The oldest man in the village wou
man in the village would say, "You may choose to put any number of eggs, from 0 to 
10, from box 1 into box 2. I will then take box 2 and give it to another person who I 
invited to the house today and exp
anyone your identity. After you make your decision, I will not look inside either box so 
I will not know what your decision was. Afterwards, you may have your free meal and 
then you may leave with box 1, c
for yourself. I will now cover my eyes so you can make your decision."
52 
ld place box 1 and box 2 before Person 1. The oldest 
lain to that person what happened. I will not tell 
ontaining whatever number of eggs you chose to keep 
 
  
 Then the oldest man in the village would cover his eyes so he didn't see what Person 1 
was doing. Person 1 would put whatever numb
53 
er of eggs he wished to put into box 2.
 
  
 Then the oldest man in the village would take box 2 and walk to room 2.The oldest man 
in the village would explain to Person 2 what had happened in room 1 with Person 1.
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 The oldest man in the village would then
it. Then he would say, "You may take this box with you when you leave. You may now 
have your free meal and leave when you are finished."
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 give box 2 to Person 2 without looking inside 
  
 Then Person 1 and Person 2 would get free meals.
56 
 
  
 Then Person 1 would leave with box 1 and Person 2 would leave with box 2.
This happened every year and was called The Meeting.
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Appendix B: Stimuli for Experiment 2 
Part I: Description of The Meeting 
During medieval times, there was a custom called The Meeting, which was performed 
every year. The Meeting normally went as follows:  
 
The Meeting 
 
The oldest man in the village would go into the marketplace.  
                 
He would randomly select two people who did not know each other (we can call them 
Person 1 and Person 2). He would approach each individually to preserve their 
anonymity and say, "I would like you to come to my house tomorrow and spend some 
time with me. I will give you a free meal just for showing up."
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 The following day, Person 1 and Person 2 w
60 
ould go to the house separately so that they 
never saw each other.  
 
 The oldest man in the village would ask Person 1 to sit in 
61 
room 1 and ask Pe
in room 2.  
 
rson 2 to sit 
 Then the oldest man in the village would enter room 1 carrying two boxes. Both box
62 
and box 2 would be empty.  
 
 1 
 The oldest man in the village would place two boxes before Person 1. The oldest man in 
the village would say, "I need 10 logs for firewood. There is a log pile outside. I would 
like you to go get 10 logs from it and bring th
place 1 egg into box 1, up to 10 eggs.
63 
em inside. For each log you bring in, I will 
  
 
 Person 1 would leave the house and go out to the log pile to get the first log.
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 The oldest man in the village would put 1 egg into box 1 for each log Person 1 brought
65 
into the house.  
 
 
 Person 1 would keep bringing in logs until he had brought in 10 logs. The oldest man in 
the village would keep putting eggs into box 1 until he had put 10 eggs into box 1.
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 At this point, box 1 would contain 10 eggs and box 2 would st
man in the village would say, "You may choose to put any number of eggs, from 0 to 
10, from box 1 into box 2. I will then take box 2 and give it to another person who I 
invited to the house today and explain to that person what hap
anyone your identity. After you make your decision, I will not look inside either box so 
I will not know what your decision was. Afterwards, you may have your free meal and 
then you may leave with box 1, containing whatever number of
for yourself. I will now cover my eyes so you can make your decision."
67 
ill be empty. The oldest 
pened. I will not tell 
 eggs you chose to keep 
 
  
 Then the oldest man in the village would cover his eyes so he didn't see what Person 1 
was doing. Person 1 would put whatever number of eggs he wished to put 
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into box 2.  
 Then the oldest man in the village would take box 2 and walk to room 2. The oldest 
man in the village would explain to Person 2 what had happened in room 1 with Person 
69 
1.  
 
 The oldest man in the village would then give box 2 to Person 2 wit
it. Then he would say, "You may take this box with you when you leave. You may now 
have your free meal and leave when you are finished."
70 
hout looking inside 
 
  
 Then Person 2 and Person 1 would get free meals.
71 
 
  
 Then Person 1 would leave with box 1 and Per
This happened every year and was called The Meeting.
 
 
 
 
72 
son 2 would leave with box 2.
 
  
  
